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The central theme of the Hague 
Convention ('the convention') is a 
presumption favouring the immediate 
return of a child to his or her habitual 
residence. This presumption mandates 
that all conflicts arising at any point in a 
proceeding must be resolved in favour of 
returning the child. It arises from the 
very nature of the convention. When a 
country becomes a contracting state 
under the convention, it is assumed that 
its courts have equal dignity with the 
courts of all other contracting states and 
that it is the courts of the child's habitual 
residence which are in the best position 
to determine what is in the best interests 
of the child. If this were not so, the 
convention would fail.
One document that should be read, 
reviewed and consulted on a regular basis 
in an action under the convention is the 
Explanatory Report by E Pere/-Vera, Hague 
Conference on Private Internationa! Law, Actes 
et documents de la Quatorzieme session, vol. 
Ill, 1980, p. 426 (also available on the 
internet; see details on this page).
http://www.hiltonhouse.com
The Explanatory Report by E Perez-Vera, 
and other information relating to the 
convention and conflict with local laws is 
available on the Hilton House website.
Over the years there has been a steady 
flow of decisions in the courts of first 
instance and courts of appeal of the 
various countries that have acceded to the 
convention. These decisions are useful 
when presenting a case since they can 
often be used to explain the application 
of the convention. The US Supreme 
Court has held that the opinions of sister 
signatories to an international convention 
are entitled to significant weight (Air 
France v Saks (1985) 470 US 392).
When there is a conflict between the 
convention and the local law of the 
contracting state it is required that the 
terms of the convention prevail. In the 
US, for example, each of the 50 states has 
their own laws on custody. When these 
laws conflict with federal law, federal law 
must prevail (see Swift &^Co v Wickham 382 
US 111). This doctrine of federal 
pre-emption was specifically applied to 
conflicts between federal and state 
custody laws in Martinet v Reed (DCLa 
1985) 623 F Supp 1050. The same 
principal applies to the Hague 
Convention: issues of the best interest of 
the child must be referred back to the 
state of the habitual residence of the child 
under the terms of the convention, 
notwithstanding any local laws to the 
contrary.
WHO CAN FILE?
An issue that may arise is who can file 
an action: can an applicant be either a 
petitioner or a respondent?
The convention appears to be worded 
in such a way as to address remedies for 
the benefit of the petitioner or applicant 
  which apply only to the parent or 
institution that has lost custody of the 
child and is seeking return of the child. 
This is in keeping with the purposes of 
the convention, in that the parent 
residing in the habitual residence of theo
minor at the time of the wrongful act, 
should have control over the forum that 
determines the custody issue.
When one considers that the 
underlying purpose of the convention is 
to cause the return of a child to his or her 
habitual residence, it logically follows that
the convention exists for the benefit of 
the petitioner; an action by a respondent 
whose purpose would be to prevent the 
return of a child to his or her habitual 
residence would be contra to the 
convention. Accordingly only the person 
or agency requesting the return of the 
child to the habitual residence has the 
authority to bring an action under the 
convention.
Note that the definition of 'person' is 
broad and includes both individuals and 
institutions.
HOW TO FILE
A person wishing to institute judicial 
proceedings under the convention does 
so by filing a petition in the court whose 
venue includes the place where the child 
can be found. The petition, in order to 
give the court jurisdiction to hear the 
matter, must allege at least the following:
(1) the child was removed from his or 
her habitual residence;
(2) the petitioner had and was 
exercising, at the time of the removal,o' '
rights of custody under the law of the 
habitual residence;
(3) the child is under 16 years of age;
(4) the physical whereabouts of the 
child are in the venue of the court where 
the petition is filed.
The petition may be accompanied by 
various supporting documents and/or the 
petition may be verified by the party or 
by counsel for the petitioner.
Once the basic allegations are made, 
the petitioner has raised a prima facie 
case and, in the absence of any response, 
the court must order the return of the 
child to his or her habitual residence 
forthwith (art. 12).
HEARINGS
There are no special procedural rules 
prescribing the course of action for a 
court when a petition under the 
convention is filed. It can be said, 
however, that this is to be a speedy 
summary proceeding. The decisions 
made by courts of the contracting states 
have been in accordance with this 25
concept of a summary procedure. As a 
general rule the matter should proceed 
on affidavits only, unless there is 
compelling reason for oral testimony.
OBJECTIONS TO RETURN
Once the petitioner has made out the 
prima facie case by establishing that there 
was a 'wrongful removal' or 'wrongful 
retention', by showing that the child wasJ o
removed or withheld from his or her 
habitual residence, and that the 
petitioner has a right of custody under 
the law of the habitual residence, the 
burden of proof shifts to the respondent 
to raise any opposition to the return. Any 
objections to the return of the child have 
been generally held to be as follows:
(1) the petition for return was filed in 
the court system of the requested 
state after more than one year had 
passed since the wrongful removal 
or wrongful retention and '... it is 
demonstrated that the child is now 
settled in its new environment' 
(art. 12);
(2) the petitioner consented to the 
removal or retention from the 
habitual residence;
(3) the petitioner acquiesced to the 
removal or retention;
(4) the petitioner, at the time of the 
removal or retention, was not 
actually exercising his or her rights 
of custody under the law of the 
habitual residence;
(5) there is a grave risk that the return
* ' o
of the child would expose him or 
her to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place the child in 
an intolerable situation (the 13 (b) 
defence);
(6) The judicial or administrative 
authority may also refuse to order 
the return of the child if it finds that 
the child objects to being returned 
and has attained an age and degree 
of maturity at which it is appropriate 
to take account of its views (the age 
and maturity defence).
There is one additional objection to 
return under art. 20, namely if it is 
objectionable on human rights grounds. 
This objection also requires clear and 
convincing evidence, but this is so 
intertwined with art. 13(b) that, when it 
is raised, it is usually considered part of a 
1 3(b) defence.
Well-settled objection
When a proceeding has been 
commenced after the expiration of the 
period of one year after the wrongful 
removal or wrongful retention, the child 
shall be returned forthwith, unless the 
respondent demonstrates that the child is 
now settled in his or her new 
environment (art. f2).
Where the victim parent promptly 
makes a request for the return of the 
child to the appropriate central authority, 
and where there were diligent efforts too
locate the child, then the period in which 
an action is to be filed in a court does not 
start to run until the whereabouts of the 
child are ascertained. The one-year 
period mentioned in art. f2 does not 
continue during any period of 
concealment of the child, provided that 
the requesting parent has acted 
expeditiously in trying to locate the child.
When a child has been sent to the 
requested state for a period agreed by the 
parents, or sent by a court for a period of 
access, and the child is retained past the 
due date of return by a party in the 
requested state, this is a wrongful 
retention. Since the wrongful act does 
not occur until the return date is passed, 
the one-year period mentioned in art. f 2 
does not start to run until after the 
return date has passed.
Consent/acquiescence objection
If a wrongful removal is claimed bv the
O J
petitioner, the respondent may, under 
art. 13(a), claim that there was indeed a 
removal, but it was with the consent of 
the petitioner. Should this be shown to 
be true, although the court may still 
return the child, the mandatory return 
under art. f 2 is no longer required.
This defence can be active (consent) or 
passive (acquiescence) or some mixture 
of the two. The respondent may 
sometimes argue that the petitioner has 
acquiesced by inaction and that there is 
passive acquiescence. Court decisions, 
however, require that a positive, specific 
act of consent be made and that act of 
consent is to be carried out with due 
formality. Consent by inference is rare to 
non-existent.
Based on a review of art. 1 2 and its 
one-year period, and further based on a 
reading of the applicable cases, it is 
suggested that if the passive period is less 
than one vear, the burden should be on
the respondent to show that this was 
acquiescence. If more than one year has 
passed, it is suggested that the burden 
now shifts to the petitioner to show that 
this was not acquiescence.
Exercising rights of custody objection
The convention includes no definition 
of 'actual exercise of custody', but this 
provision expressly refers to the care of 
the child and must be liberally 
interpreted. The Australian courts have 
held that the fact that the parent and 
child were living in the same household 
was sufficient to show that a parent was 
actually exercising rights of custody.
In keeping with the spirit of the 
convention, there is a presumption that 
findings will be made by the courts that 
will cause the child to be returned. The 
respondent therefore has the burden of 
showing that the petitioner was not 
actually exercising his or her rights of 
custody. Proof of the presence of the 
petitioner in the household at the time of 
the exercise of rights of custody is 
sufficient to rebut allegations by the 
respondent that the petitioner was not 
exercising rights of custody at the time.
Grave risk objection
This is the infamous 13(b) defence. 
The person who proffers art. 13(b) as a 
reason why the child should not be 
returned faces a very difficult task, for at 
least the following reasons:
  the art. 13(b) defence is to be applied 
narrowly and restrictively;
  the respondent must establish this 
defence with clear and convincingo
evidence.
A further factor to be considered is 
that even where it can be shown that the 
petitioner is unfit to care for the child, 
the child will still be returned to his or 
her habitual residence so long as the 
courts of the habitual residence can 
assure the courts of the requested state 
that the child will be protected (e.g. 
where a safe harbour is created in the 
habitual residence   see below.)
There is a tendency for a contracting 
state which has recently acceded to the 
convention, to uphold a 13(b) defence 
more often than countries that have had 
a significant track record on this point, 
with many decisions and well-developed 
law under the convention. A centralised 
system is one where a small number of
courts in the same city as the central 
authority deals with Hague cases from all 
over the country. These cases are decided 
by a small group of judges and lawyers 
who have specialised skills in Hague 
cases. Where there is a centralised 
system, such as in the UK, this 13(b) 
defence is seldom allowed.
If it cannot be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that a child cannoto
be safely returned to the country of his or 
her habitual residence (in contrast to the 
family home in that country), then the 
child must be returned. Such evidence 
that the child cannot be safely returned 
could only happen where the courts of 
the habitual residence cannot or will not 
take such steps as are ordinarily and 
normally taken by a legal system to 
provide protection for children.
THE WISH OF THE CHILD
The issue of age and maturity is not to be 
looked upon as an issue ot the wish of 
the child to live with one parent or the 
other. The issue only relates to the 
child's objection to being returned to his 
or her habitual residence. The first step 
is to determine it the child has reached 
an age and degree of maturity where his 
or her opinion would even be 
considered, and then the wishes of the 
child must be considered in the light of 
all other relevant facts.
Even with the above strictures placed 
on the court's consideration of an art. 
f3(b) defence, courts still are tempted 
and do make rulings that purport to be 
under art. 13(b) but in reality are based 
on the considerations of what is in the 
best interests of the child. This is strictly 
forbidden by the convention.
Age and maturity objection
The final objection to return is the age 
and maturity test, where, in the words of 
the convention:
'the judicial or administrative authority 
may also refuse to order the return of the child 
ifitjinds that the child objects to being 
returned and has attained an age and degree 
of maturity at which it is appropriate to take 
account of its views.'
As with the other exceptions under 
art. 13, this one is to be used sparingly 
since, as noted above, the presumption is 
that the child will be returned to his or 
her habitual residence.
The issue of age and maturity is not to 
be looked upon as an issue of the wish of
the child to live with one parent or the 
other. The issue only relates to the child's 
objection to being returned to his or her 
habitual residence. The first step is to 
determine if the child has reached an age 
and degree of maturity where his or her 
opinion would even be considered, and 
then the wishes of the child must be 
considered in the light of all other 
relevant facts: the length of time the child 
was concealed from the requesting 
parent, the amount of influence the 
abducting parent has brought to bear on 
the child, etc.
SAFE HARBOUR ORDERS 
AND UNDERTAKINGS
While undertakings and safe harbour 
orders are not mentioned in the 
convention, there is a growing body of 
law that has approved their use in cases 
that arise under the convention.
Safe harbour orders
A safe harbour order is an order made 
by the court of the child's habitual 
residence. These orders are designed to 
provide protection to the child when the 
child is returned to his or her habitual 
residence and the jurisdiction ot the 
court of the requesting state. Safe 
harbour orders are orders that emanate 
from the court of the requesting state and 
are directed to the attention of the court 
of the requested state.
The advantage of the safe harbour 
order (also known as a request tor 
assistance) is that it is issued by the court 
that will be bound by it and therefore 
there is no issue of potential conflict as 
there is no risk that it will not be 
enforced.
Undertakings
An undertaking is a statement given 
voluntarily by a party to the court of the 
requested state promising to do or not to 
do an act. The purpose of the 
undertaking is to ensure that the child is 
protected during and after the child has 
been returned to his or her habitual 
residence. For example, a father may 
promise the court that if an order is made 
to return the child to the child's habitual 
residence at his request, then he will 
provide a separate home for the mother 
and the child and provide support 
payments. Such an undertaking is 
effectively enforceable as a court order by 
the court to which the undertaking is 
given.
Because an undertaking is given to the 
court of the requested state it has no 
effect in the jurisdiction of the court of 
the child's habitual residence. For this 
reason an undertaking is not as 
satisfactory as a safe harbour order made 
by the requesting court in the child's 
habitual residence.
MIRROR ORDERS
Article 7 of the convention states, in 
part, that the central authorities and 
other competent officials of the 
contracting states shall co-operate with 
one another in furtherance of the goals of 
the convention. This co-operation has 
included direct contact between judges of 
the requesting and requested states. This 
direct contact has allowed the courts of 
the two countries involved in a decision 
about a child to put in place orders in 
both countries that can be enforced in 
those countries and that ensure the safe 
return to and interim care of the child in 
the child's habitual residence. This type 
of order is called a mirror order.
A typical example would be where the 
judges confer by telephone and then 
make mirror orders that the child is to be 
returned to the child's habitual residence 
in the care of the abducting parent, but 
that all orders that would have 
discouraged the return, made by the 
court of the child's habitual residence, 
are to be staved. Such orders which 
might have discouraged the return of the 
child are, for example, custody orders in 
favour of the other party or criminal 
proceedings.
STAY ORDERS
Under art. f6 a court of the requested 
state, if it learns that an application is 
being sought for the return of the child, 
must stay any proceeding that has before 
it the merits of the custody dispute. Such 
a stay is automatic. It does not require 
any application to the court. The 
existence of a Hague case stops any other 
case proceeding until after the Hague 
case has been determined. @
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